(2) Affirmative action benefits primarily those blacks already more advantaged (e.g., credentialed, middle-class blacks, mostly in two-parent households) and makes more disadvantaged blacks (e.g., poor, uncredentialed blacks, predominantly in female-headed households) worse off by securing racially earmarked benefits for the few at the expense of neutral, free market conditions that would aid the many (pp. 51-53, 86-90, 110) .
(3) Calls for affirmative action serve to politicize racial and ethnic differen~ which, in tum, can lead to racial polarization, barbarism, or even genocide by the majority against the minority group seeking racial preferences (pp. 33-35, 90, 118) .
(4) Unnamed (except for Andrew Young (p. 139)) civil rights leaders, as well as federal judges, who have cited discrimination as the cause of inferior black status and espoused affirmative action as the remedy, have contributed to a decline in community and personal standards and in family responsibility among many blacks today (pp. 85, 118-20) , and to the growing racial intolerance of so many whites (pp. 118-19) . 1 (5) Law, political effort, and governmental action are unable to alter cultural patterns (pp. 19-21, 29-33, 48-50, 74) . 2 Sowell's attack on the limits of law and political action runs deep: such action is "neither necessary nor sufficient for economic advancement" (p. 32) and has had an "unpromising record" (p. 35) as a means for raising the incomes of low-income groups; indeed, legal and political action has contributed to "counter-chauvinism" by the dominant groups in society against minorities (pp. 33-34) . He argues that many ethnic groups even prospered under diverse regimes of discrimination although, at least as Sowell would have it, immigrant Germans "were notorious for their non-participation in politics in colonial Pennsylvania," 3 the Chinese "have studiously avoided politics" (p. 30), and "Jews only belat-edly sought public office" (p. 31). 4 For Sowell, " [g] roups that have the skills for other things seldom concentrate on politics" (p. 32).
I. COMPETING VISIONS
Recognition of the causal power of cultural factors in determining inequalities between racial groups and the counterproductive force of affirmative action and civil rights rhetoric is Sowell's cornerstone for hard-headed public policy today. Sowell proposes that Brown v. Board of Education 5 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 6 be understood simply as outlawing all forms of invidious discrimination against individuals by mandating strict race neutrality (pp. 37-38) . From this perspective, Sowell proclaims that affirmative race-conscious remedies are counter-4. Sowell's contention that the minority groups that have prospered have generally been apolitical is subject to dispute. Consider a few counterexamples. After using organized protest to combat hotel discrimination against Jews as early as 1877, see L. DAWIDOWICZ, ON EQUAL TERMS: JEWS IN AMERICA, 1881 -1981 , at 40-41 (1980 , American Jews "mounted a successful campaign to prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodation in 1913." N. CoHEN, NOT FREE TO DESISr: THE AMERICAN JEWISH CoMMITIEE 1906 -1966 , at 384 (1972 . In Woodrow Wilson's administration, Jews were "thrilled" by the influence of Bernard Baruch, Louis D. Brandeis and Henry Morgenthau. L. FucHS, THE PoLmCAL BEHAVIOR OF AMERI- CAN JEWS 60 (1956) . In 1930, Jews were elected governors of New Mexico (Arthur Seligman), Illinois (Henry Homer), and Oregon (Julius Meier), and Franklin D. Roosevelt won the New York governorship with a Jewish running mate, Herbert Lehman. Id. at 68-69. And during F.D.R.'s reign, anti-Semitic charges of something like favoritism were made because of the overwhelming political support of Jews for Roosevelt and because of the many Jewish advisors on whom he relied (e.g., Lehman, Morgenthau, Felix Frankfurter, and Anna Rosenberg) . Id. at 99. According to Lawrence Fuchs, however, "If Jews had not rewarded their friends with votes they would certainly be different from any other group which has ever crossed the American political scene." Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
The Japanese have also been politically active. At the turn of the century, for example, they organized "demonstrations and meetings of their own . . • , mak [ing] thousands of speeches and publish [ing] dozens of books and pamphlets" in successfully opposing their inclusion in the 1902 Chinese Exclusion Act. R. DANIELS, THE PoLmCS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 23 (1968) . When herded into concentration camps on the West Coast, the Japanese challenged such action through what they felt was the most politically feasible alternative: litigation. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944) , particularly the 200-page amicus brief filed by the JapaneseAmerican Citizens League. To the degree the Japanese did try to keep a low profile politically, it obviously did not prevent racial backlash. See generally P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983) . From 1950 to 1952, Mike Masoka, the president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, "a powerful and effective lobbyist in the House and Senate," initiated and helped steer through a provision in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act eliminating some of the discrimination against Japanese-Americans. M. FuKUDA, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS 69-71 (1980) . Sowell also continually refers to the apolitical nature of the Chinese. Pp. 20, [27] [28] [29] [30] 33 . Like blacks, however, the Chinese have for more than a century coordinated their protest efforts through a carefully designed litigation strategy, of which Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) , is only the most prominent result. See also McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850 -1870 , 72 CALIF. L. REv. 529, 567 (1984 ("The enactment of section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 should be seen as the culmination of a long, patient struggle by the leadership of the mid-nineteenth century Chinese immigrant community to achieve basic civil rights and to secure for themselves the principle of equal treatment under law.").
5. 347 U. S. 483 (1954 ). 6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § § 101 et seq., 78 Stat. 241 (1964 . [Vol. 83:1065 productive aberrations. 7 The premise of this view of social reality is that discrimination can best be understood by scrutinizing separately the racial content of each isolated transaction (e.g., securing a house, a job, an education, or a bus seat) without regard to the larger context in which those decisions take place. Discrimination occurs, and personal freedom is denied, only if a particular decisionmaker intentionally imposes racial barriers to an individual exchange. Although some groups and individuals can overcome such barriers solely on the strength of their own drives and because of the limited ability of any authority positively to impose discrimination (pp. 26-29, 31, 47, 77-79, 130-31) , Sowell concedes that isolated racial hurdles which exist under the law should nevertheless be stricken for the sake of a color-blind public morality (pp. 37-38). 8 To one, like Sowell, who insists on the view that civil rights issues arise only in the context of isolated transactions, race-conscious remedies are anathema. Such group remedies sweep far beyond any individual wrongs and, at best, give unjustified advantages to members of the minority group who have suffered no harm, while imposing costs on innocent whites who have done no wrong. 9 At worst, affirmative 7 .. See pp. 33-35, 39-42, 61-69, 139. 8. In defining his civil rights "reality" in the contexts of employment, pp. 37-42, 59, and school desegregation, pp. 61-69, Sowell assumes that once an individual is theoretically free to engage in transactions, his civil rights problems as such are over. Seep. 139 ; but see note 9 infra. Sowell ignores the possibility that systemic effects of past discrimination may obstruct the formal "free choice" of the individual. See U.S. CoMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DE-SEGREGATION, 1966 -67, at 88 (1967 9. Imagine, however, a country in which a color line has been drawn by the white majority, on one side of which whites can live and on the other blacks must reside. Whites maintain signs declaring the racial divide for several generations. An anti-majoritarian court then declares such forced segregation illegal. The white majority responds by taking down the signs and forbidding any affirmative relief on the grounds that (1) the higher law now requires absolute color blindness, (2) no individual is formally subject to racial proscriptions any longer, and (3) current white families are not responsible for the caste restrictions imposed by their forebears on blacks. Although we concede that the reality of discrimination in America has always been considerably more complex, imposing a color-blind standard on a racially skewed gameboard can be understood as freezing in the systemic bias of the prior discrimination, thereby allowing it to continue to work against the current members of the racial minority. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) ; North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) ; Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion); Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006 , 1006 (1984 (discussing the inappropriateness of applying an "ideal society" principle of "colorblindness" in a society "still permeated by racial discrimination and .
• . by the traces of racial oppression").
While the exact relationship between such a caste system and economic and career opportunities cannot be calibrated precisely, neither can the reality of some causal nexus be dismissed.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395-96 (Marshall, J., separate opinion). One can only speculate on how many life chances are denied and networks of opportunity foreclosed to minority children confined to urban and rural ghettoes as compared to their white counterparts. See Carter, The Freedom Train Has Lost Its Momentum, Wall St. J., June 21, 1984, at 35, col. 6 ("Ask any black youngster action and school busing, for example, serve to rekindle the racialism that leads to backlash as newly aggrieved whites strike back.
There is, however, a different vision of social reality, one which is neither so simplistic as Sowell's caricature of civil rights rhetoric nor as narrow as Sowell's own view. Under this view, individual transactions are seen as taking place in the context of larger markets and social spheres that have been shaped by a variety of factors that are subject to some influence, for good or ill, by public action and concerted private effort. Although causal connections are neither simple nor capable of precise delineation, there remains real concern that institutional bias and systemic discrimination have left enduring barriers that continue to obstruct the opportunities of members of historically victimized groups.
The recognition that such caste wrong persists does not lead one who holds this view to attribute all current disparities directly to historic grievances. Neither does it absolve individual members of minority groups from taking personal responsibility for their own fates. But this approach does not permit causal uncertainty and complexity to be used as rationalizations for excusing the historic majority from confronting the continuing legacy of racial discrimination. This anti-caste view recognizes that all individuals have a basic right to be free from any systemic headwinds of lingering discrimination, while society as a whole has an obligation to assist members of historic outgroups to join the mainstream. 10 There may be transactional costs, inefficiencies and dislocations along the way, but something more than a micro-level zero-sum game is at stake: Making room at the top does not necessarily require a free fall at the bottom. 11 Such a reconstruction process requires all of the institutions in our democracy -and the peopleto consider diverse remedies and programs that do something more than just declare proven discrimination unlawful. 12 in any city whether he and his friends have anything in common with their white contemporaries in the suburbs, and you'll be lucky if he only laughs in your face. They might as well be living on different planets, and the gulf is growing."). Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1983 Ct. 2576 Ct. (1984 , however, the Supreme Court decided in favor of seniority, see note 53 infra, and ignored the fact that "[t]he preliminary injunction did not require the city to lay off any white employees at all. In fact, several parties interested in the suit, including the union, attempted to persuade the city to avoid layoffs entirely by reducing the working hours of all fire department employees." 104 S. Ct. at 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See generally
12. In traditional, two-tier equal protection review, race is seen prima facie as an irrational basis on which to exclude minority persons from neighborhoods, schools, work places, benefit programs, and the front of the bus; strict scrutiny has been applied to such suspect classifications. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) . Although neither of us believes that a two-tier approach should be the central focus of judicial review of race cases, see, e.g., Dimond , supra note 10, at 7-8 n.19, race-conscious reme- [Vol. 83:1065 
II. HISTORICAL REFRAINS AND CONTEMPORARY CHOICES
For societies, as well as individuals, it often seems easier to wish away rather than confront the painful vestiges of past wrongdoing. It is not easy to face the dilemmas of causal uncertainty and the dislocations inherent in overcoming caste barriers. It is easier, and often more popular, either to posit a clean slate or to wring one's hands over the limited effectiveness and counterproductivity of specific remedies or of governmental reform in general. Sowell's rhetoric combines all of these rationalizations: [T] Of course, when discrimination is viewed from the narrower perspective of isolated transactions without regard to the larger social context, it is even easier to argue that outlawing particular racial wrongs affords complete relief. For example, the claim that affirmative action legislation to protect blacks is not appropriate was heard during the abolition of slavery just as it is today during the process of dismantling caste discrimination. 13 It is therefore hardly surprising that rhetoric and "reality" similar to that espoused by Sowell were embraced as national public policy at another time in our historythe period from 1883 to 1896, when the Supreme Court marked the end of the first Reconstruction. In the Civil Rights Cases, 14 for example, the Court held that Congress lacked power to outlaw racial exclusion and segregation in inns, theaters, public conveyances and other public accommodations by declaring that, at least as of 1883, the freedman had "take[n] the rank of mere citizen, and cease [d] to be the dies can be understood as a rational approach to tearing down caste barriers and to overcoming their enduring effects. If caste discrimination aimed at subjugating a particular minority group has succeeded in inflicting any such systemic injury, group remedies are tailored to fit the group wrong. Such rational remedial responses, however, are a far cry from any claim to group rights.
See Dimond, supra note 10, at 6-10. MAN 177 (1970) . Senator James w. Grimes echoed this sentiment during early debates on the Freedmen's Bureau: "Aie they free men, or are they not? If they are free men, why not let them stand as free men ... 7" CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2972 (1864).
14. 109 U. S. 3 (1883) special favorite of the laws." 15 After all, ran the argument, the Civil War Amendments, the earlier Civil Rights Acts, and the Freedmen's Bureau had long since abolished slavery and attempted to provide something more than formal equality under the law to the former slaves. With "the aid of [such] beneficent legislation," wrote Justice Bradley for the Court, the freedmen surely had "shaken off the inseparable concomitants of [the] state" of slavery. 16 In the absence of a clearly identifiable act of discrimination or other default by a particular State, the Court rejected Solicitor General Phillips' argument that the 1875 Civil Rights Act, "considering what must be the social tendency in at least large parts of the country," represented "appropriate legislation" by Congress under the enforcement sections of the Civil War Amendments. 17 In 10, at 17 & n.45) . Justice Harlan's retort to the majority's sophistry was direct: "The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens. . . . At every step in this direction, the nation has been confronted with class tyranny [against blacks]." 109 U.S. at 61-62.
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 19. 163 U.S. at 551-52. The Court added, if"the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . , it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." 163 U.S. at 551. In his dissent, Harlan rejoined: "Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose • • . to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. . . . [Such] enactments ... proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens." 163 U.S. at 557, 560. Harlan added, of course, the now famous quotation, "Our Constitution is color-blind •.
•. " 163 U.S. at 559. Read in its full context, however, Harlan's notion resembles more an anti-caste than simply a race-neutral standard of judicial review: " [T] here is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens." 163 U.S. at 559. And in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 62 (1883), Harlan had said, "If the constitutional amendments be enforced, ... there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to another class . . 995, 999-1000 (1984) . In 1964 as in 1896, however, "colorblindness" meant primarily one thing in contemporaneous context to civil rights advocates -ending caste subjugation of blacks. Thus, these pleas [Vol. 83:1065 served to rationalize the end of the first Reconstruction. In arguing that cultural drive and individual initiative must substitute for political action and race-conscious calls for redress, Sowell offers a prescription similar to that advocated by Booker T. Washington in 1895 for curing "the Negro problem":
It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top . . . . . . . In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.
The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. 20 Responding to Washington's plea "that black people give up .. political power [and] insistence on civil rights," W.E.B. DuBois reminded that the "result of this tender of the palm-branch . . . has been . . . the disfranchisement of the Negro [and] the legal creation of a distinct status of civil inferiority for the Negro." 21 DuBois then offered an alternative call:
[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line .
. [T] he Negro is in danger of being reduced to semi-slavery . . . .
. . [T]
he hands of none of us are clean if we bend not our energies to righting these great wrongs. 22 With the glacial progress following his calls to confront the color line directly, DuBois later came to argue for black self-reliance and economic self-sufficiency, but never on the grounds that the color line had been eliminated or Jim Crow subjugation by the white majority overcome. 23 for "colorblindness" can be understood more broadly as a call to halt the invidious use of skin color to exclude minority persons from the mainstream of national life.
20 FOLKWAYS 77-78 (1940) . Indeed, Washington likely borrowed the "separate as fingers" analogy from the author of another post-Reconstruction "compromise," Rutherford B. Hayes. When Washington was teaching at the Hampton Institute in May 1880, ex-President Hayes delivered an address there in which he said:
We would not undertake to violate the laws of nature, we do not wish to change the purpose of God in making these differences of nature. We are willing to have these elements of our population separate as the fingers are, but we require to see them united for every good work, for national defense, one, as the hand. And that good work Hampton is doing. Despite warnings by many to proceed more cautiously, Dr. Martin Luther King continued to answer the call of DuBois three score years later by leading nonviolent protests. Those protests were met by the violent "counter-chauvinism" (pp. 33-34) of whites, for example Bull Connor's vicious dogs, clubs, and hoses in Birmingham, Alabama. 24 The results of such concerted political confrontation by blacks with the white majority's color line include the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 25 Today we face the choice whether to continue the reconstruction process started by the modem civil rights movement or, as Washington advised before, to denigrate direct challenges to discrimination.
Sowell's rhetoric, in sum, provides a haunting refrain to that which marked the end of the first Reconstruction a century ago. It is not too much to ask that the nation pause to consider the awful consequences of accepting the rationalizations which ended the first Reconstruction before embracing Sowell's similar vision of reality today to finish the second. 26 III. STRA w MEN Sowell, of course, has a ready-made response to this comparison of his rhetoric with that of the post-Reconstruction era-a personal and sometimes openly bitter epilogue (pp. 123-40) which seeks to characterize criticism of his analysis as merely the toppling of "straw man" views that Sowell has never advocated, or as "blind mudslinging" by Joe McCarthy-type slanderers.
While Sowell thus seeks to proclaim "The Degeneration of Racial Controversy" (p. 123), an examination of his own work in this book § § 1973-1973p (1982) ).
Economic boycotts directed against employers also contributed to breaking the whites-only color bar in public and private employment. See generally M.L. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, supra note 24, at 105-06; H. SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954 EQUALITY, -1980 EQUALITY, , at 146, 149 (1981 . Now that the Supreme Court has provided broad first amendment protection for such direct action in the economic arena, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) , it remains to be seen the extent to which such concerted pressure will be able to contribute more generally to the economic advancement of minority Americans.
Commenting on criticisms about his Atlanta Exposition address, Washington expressed a view in 1901 quite similar to Sowell's view in 1984:
My own belief is .
• . that the time will come when the Negro in the South will be accorded all the political rights • . . entitled to him. I think, though, that the opportunity to freely exercise such political rights will not come in any large degree through outside or artifical forcing, but will be accorded to the Negro by the Southern white people themselves . . (1974) . [Vol. 83:106S reveals that it is Sowell himself who prefers to do battle with straw men. Five examples will suffice. First, as Michael Harrington has noted, Sowell creates his own straw man civil rights advocate who thinks "discrimination is the only reason for statistical differences between racial and ethnic groups" in order to create "simplistic dichotomies" that can be attacked on the basis of simplistic dichotomies. 27 Yet Sowell's attack, as Harrington points out, is "irrelevant, since I know of no serious civil rights partisan who engages in such obvious simplifications." 28 There is an alternative to the simplistic views that only culture, discrimination, or innate inferiority can be the cause of current intergroup disparities. 29 Second, Sowell's analysis of cause and effect relationships since 1954 between periods of civil rights agitation and the passage of civil rights laws, and between the passage of those laws and economic gains by blacks, is similarly skewed. Whether things would have been worse had there been no such affirmative efforts, and the interrelationship between public policy and complex economic, business, social, and political factors are never discussed in Sowell's book. 35 The citation of such simplistic "before and after" statistics may be intended only to topple the equally simplistic For us, the primary issue raised by Sowell's critique is not the relative efficacy of that movement, but whether its business should be declared at an end.
32. It seems bizarre that Sowell, who begins by asserting that political action is "unpromising" as a means to economic advancement for black Americans, p. 35, and who then goes on to deplore the lack of empirical study, p. 133, never even discusses, let alone analyzes, the effects of Minorities, represented disproportionately on the bottom rung, were hit hard by such trends. Blacks with college degrees and luck, writes Michael Harrington, "made gains because of that economic trend and because of affirmative action, which does work to limit discriminatory patterns in an expanding labor market but not to create jobs in declining areas of employment."
Harrington, supra note 27, at 38.
[Vol. 83:106S "civil rights" straw man posited by Sowell. 36 If the only point of Sowell's exercise is that there is uncertainty concerning the causes of social and economic inequalities among groups, we concede the point. This concession, however, only begins the dialogue over how to confront the continuing gaps between groups. 37 Third, Sowell argues that Brown v. Board of Education was based primarily on "psychological doctrine, without foundation in logic or law" (p. 71), and misled subsequent courts into ordering busing to integrate schools on the mistaken premise that blacks would learn better if placed in schools next to white pupils, because schools with too many black students are somehow inherently inferior (pp. 61-72). Such charges are unfounded. First, Chief Justice Warren has denied that the infamous footnote 11 was a motive force in the Brown decision. 38 Second, a companion case outlawing segregation in District of 36. While Sowell repeatedly calls for evidence, see, e.g., pp. 133, 138, he himself relies on broad macroeconomic statistics to buttress causal inferences which challenge affirmative action. Yet causation at that level is quite complex, uncertain, and subject to diverse interpretations. And in the area of anti-discrimination law that Sowell mocks the most, to wit, class-action dispa• rate impact cases, pp. 37-60, there are many specific examples of almost revolutionary employment improvement for blacks. As Douglas B. Huron, a former attorney in the Nixon-Ford Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, has detailed, affirmative action remedies were clearly and directly responsible for breaking the exclusive dominance of whites in the Alabama state government. See Huron, But Government Can Help, Washington Post., Aug. 12, 1984, at Bl, col. 2. In 1972 all of the state troopers, officers and Department of Public Safety support personnel in Alabama were white. Only a handful of other state agency employees were nonwhite. District Judge Frank Johnson remanded the matter to the state agencies -allowing them up to two years -for a remedy. Only after their failure did Johnson order comprehensive affirmative relief. Black state troopers now constitute over 20% of the force, and nearly 25% of the support personnel are black, owing largely to the state's eventual response to Judge Johnson's decrees.
Id.
Nor is this an isolated example. The Detroit Police Department went from 6% black in 1967 to 27.9% black in 1984 as a result of affirmative action remedies for "invidious racial discrimination in the Detroit Police Department." N.A.A.C.P. v. Detroit Police Officers Assn., S91 F. Supp. 1194 , 1199 -200 (E.D. Mich. 1984 . "Police brutality against citizens has been greatly reduced and is almost nil at the present time." S91 F. Supp. at 1206. Affirmative action programs were also responsible for breaking the color line in other state agencies and state highway patrols. See, e.g., Morrow v. Dillard, S80 F.2d 1284 , 1288 n.24 (5th Cir. 1978 324, 367 (1977) , the Court wrote:
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claimant had not formally applied for the job could exclude from the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms of discrimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful practices had been so successful as totally to deter job applications from members of minority groups. 38. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1976) .
Columbia schools never relied on any such "scientific" authority, 39 and per curiam decisions outlawing segregation in parks, theaters and public conveyances followed Brown. 40 Third, most legal scholars have also criticized the so-called equal educational opportunity rationale claimed by Sowell as the basis for declaring governmentally condoned segregation unconstitutional. 41 The reason, however, is that the Brown decision has an airtight claim to moral and constitutional integrity wholly unrelated to any social science study: those who are in the mainstream and in control may not seek to label any group inferior and to reduce it to a second-class status. 42 Finally, subsequent desegregation decisions in the Supreme Court (and most lower courts) 43 were based expressly on a review of the evidence of governmental and 43. Sowell cites a Los Angeles busing decision as proof that more recent decisions have ordered racial mixing on the false premise that blacks need to sit next to whites in school in order to learn. P. 69. In addition to being an isolated example of judicial misperception, see notes 39-42 supra and 44 infra, this citation is deceiving for several reasons. First, Judge Egly was a single Los Angeles Superior Court Judge. Second, his decree was based on a controversial interpretation of both the evidence (which also included proof of historic discrimination) and the California state (not the federal) Constitution. Third, this state-court decision was later overturned by the califomia Court of Appeals. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 113 Cal. App.3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) , ajfd., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) . This is hardly sufficient evidence to [Vol. 83:1065 customary discrimination contributing to segregation and not on any assessment of educational inputs and outputs or the supposed educational harm of segregated (or benefits of integrated) schooling. 44 In sum, and once again contrary to Sowell's claims (pp. 64-68), evidence and findings of discrimination, not blind pursuit of any "racial mixing" (p. 68), have been the hallmark of judicial decisions concerning school segregation. 45 Evidence in open court has remained the sustain the otherwise unsupported assertion by Sowell that federal courts generally ordered "racial mixing" unrelated to prior discrimination. P. 68. 44. Sowell's contention that the "modem authority" cited in footnote 11 contains assumptions that "have continued to haunt school desegregation," p. 64, is false. S. 527 (1982) , as an example of the ineffectiveness of preferential policies: "When mandatory busing was overruled and stopped in Los Angeles, school integration continued. There are long waiting lists of people of all races for the 'magnet' schools of that city." P. 111. For three reasons, Sowell's choice of this example reaches the height of irony. First, such voluntary desegregation is required in Los Angeles without any findings of intentional discrimination because California courts interpret their state Constitution to require desegregation regardless of the cause of such segregation. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963) . Although Proposition I outlawed mandatory reassignments as a remedy in the absence of a federal constitutional violation, California courts still require school boards to take other feasible steps to alleviate school segregation under the "results" approach that Sowell denounces. Pp. 53-60, 65-69. See McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 31 Cal. 3d 79, 92-93, 181 Cal. Rptr. 549, 642 P.2d 460 (1982) . Second, "magnet school" plans, like "majority-to-minority" transfer programs, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971), usually include "preferential" policies of one kind or another. Finally, the effectiveness of "magnet schools," standing alone, as a remedy in overcoming (rather than increasing) segregation is subject to dispute. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328,  ally of those civil rights advocates who claim that a caste system of segregation still divides too much of the country; these advocates ask only for a fair hearing of their claim, unobscured by predetermined rationalizations for current segregation.
46
Fourth, Sowell's hope that Brown can be understood as a narrow ruling barring only discriminatory limits on an individual's choice of school (pp. 37-38, 64, 68, 71 ) is just as wide of the mark. Brown involved more than the right of individual black children to transfer to otherwise whites-only schools; it sought a "transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system, " 47 allowing delay in individual transfers only because of "the public interest in the elimination of. . . obstacles in a systematic and effective manner." 48 Sowell's crabbed understanding of discrimination as involving individual transactions removed from their socio-historical context is repeated in his discussion of Green v. County School Board. 49 The Court did not, as Sowell implies (pp. [66] [67] [68] , reject the ideal of free choice on the assumption that "racial mixing was considered a good thing" (p. 68). Instead, the Court rejected the discriminatory reality of the particular "free choice" plan as it operated in 1967 in New Kent County, Virginia. 50 Sowell's at- 345-46 (D. Del. 1976 ). According to former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Drew Days III, "experience has shown" that magnet schools "rarely, if ever, will . . . be effective without some mandatory student assignment. 49. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) . 50. The Court makes no mention of any "educational benefit" rationale in its ruling. Instead, the Court recites facts which demonstrate that New Kent County ran its schools on virtually a dual basis, with one school primarily for whites and the other reserved exclusively for blacks. See Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42. The Court did not, however, declare freedom-of-choice plans unconstitutional per se, even in the context of dismantling dual systems. 391 U.S. at 439. Professor Dimond has argued that the basic policy choice concerning pupil assignments to schools (compulsory assignment vs. family election) still rests largely with the states. See Dimond, supra note 10, at 44-48, 61. Indeed, the refusal of the Court, the Congress, and the states to consider the range of available alternatives in remedying the comprehensive caste discrimina- [Vol. 83:1065 tack on the Court, therefore, is irrelevant because much in the Court's segregation rulings is lost or obscured in Sowell's translation. 51 Fifth 55 As a result, Sowell apparently proceeds on the false assumption that the Court has either embraced a standard of equality of results (p. 42) or adopted Sowell's imagined civil rights vision that all group disparities result from discrimination (p. 42). 56 tion wrong, not only in the schools but in all aspects of community life, only serves to obscure this issue. Id. at 33-62.
51. While we do not applaud the Burger Court's segregation rulings, see note SO supra and note 71 infra, Sowell's criticism appears to be based on a complete misunderstanding of what the Court has ruled and why.
52. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) . 53. While Congress did not conclusively sanction or prohibit race-conscious remedies, the affirmative plan voluntarily adopted in Weber is consistent both with the overriding purpose of the act -ending the "glaring ... discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our For his attack on race-conscious remedies, Sowell relies on Senator Humphrey's remark that § 7030) "does not require an employer to achieve any kind of racial balance." P. 39 (emphasis added). This quotation, however, does not buttress Sowell's claim for several reasons. First, § 703(1) is geared toward defining the violation, not limiting the scope of the remedy. Second, the affirmative action plan in Weber was voluntary, not required. Third, Humphrey's comments must be read in the context in which they were made, during consideration of an act designed to begin to do away with systemic discrimination against blacks as a group. See note 19 supra. 56. Weber, Bakke and Fullilove hardly represent a vision of equal results -even from the Brennan wing of the Burger Court. Rather, these affirmative action cases offer somewhat muddled plurality decisions which provide clear guidance on only one issue: it is not unconstitutional per se for majority-dominated institutions to seek to afford race-conscious relief to members of minority groups which have been the butt of past discrimination.
Sowell, therefore, misses the point of the Court's rulings to date on affirmative action: the Court has been unwilling to prohibit responsible legislative assemblies elected by the people ( expressly Congress, but presumably state legislatures as well) 57 from grappling with the difficult public policy issues raised by a history of discrimination against minority out-groups and adopting affirmative action as a remedy. 58 Sowell may wish that the Court would impose a straitjacket to outlaw once and for all such legislative consideration of the issue, arising as it does in a variety of circumstances over time, but the Court has generally acted to encourage a broad range of flexible legislative responses to the problem, at least for the time being. 59 How such a limited role for unelected Supreme Court justices can be labelled an 51. Fullilove offered important insights into the institutional considerations that may most concern certain members of the Court. When it was Congress and not the courts (or unrepresentative faculty admission committees and unelected university regents) devising the remedy, the Supreme Court did not apply formalistic right-remedy tailoring notions. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477-78, 483 (Burger, C.J.); 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring REv. 1281 REv. (1976 . Instead, the Court offered strong moral as well as constitutional approval of the "minority business enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976. Wrote Burger, "The legislative objectives of the MBE provision must be considered against the background of ongoing efforts directed toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of economic opportunity." 448 U.S. at 463. Wrote Powell, "Congress properly may -and indeed must -address directly the problems of discrimination in our society." 448 U.S. at 499.
While the opinion in Fullilove was based expressly on the "competence" of Congress to deal with a problem "national in scope," 448 U.S. at 478, the underlying rationale rests on a "considered decision" by an elected legislature and executive. 448 U.S. at 473. This suggests that the Court will view as equally legitimate attempts by state legislatures (in contrast to unelected, official elites, as in Bakke) to respond, particularly in view of the responsibility imposed directly on the states by § 1 of the fourteenth amendment.
58. While the Court's response in Bakke and Fullilove may be unsatisfactory to those impatient with persistent racial inequality, the Court has at least kept the doors open for the political process to confront the problems of systemic wrongs and comprehensive remedies. Concern for the costs to be borne by innocent whites has been a major competing claim raised by some members of the Court, as well as the Reagan administration, for opposing affirmative action. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 Ct. (1984 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ; Reynolds, supra note 19, at 1004. While the plight of innocent whites affected by race-conscious remedies is an important concern, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds seems bent on avoiding consideration of the possibility that the failure to make any affirmative efforts also may impose costs on innocent people: the innocent members of minority communities may not have the same opportunities for advancement as their majority counterparts because of the persistent effects of systemic discrimination directed against the minority as a group. See Part I supra.
59. The Supreme Court has tended to review "benign" racial classifications with "less" than a "strict scrutiny" standard. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., separate opinion). The standards of review of race-conscious classifications can perhaps best be understood in light of the anti-caste principle, see Dimond, supra note 10, at 14-15, 37, and John Hart Ely's "representation-reenforcing" theory. Writes Dean Ely:
When the group that controls the decisionmaking process classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking. A White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative classification that would extend to certain Whites the advantages generally extended to blacks.
[ Vol. 83:1065 "especially brazen . . . perversion[ ] of the law" (p. 120) is a mystery. 60 Sowell's vituperative battles with largely irrelevant or imagined opponents serve only to obscure his analyses of particular programs, which are at least thought-provoking. He observes, for example, that affirmative action increases employer demand for highly qualified blacks but decreases demand for blacks with fewer qualifications or no track record (p. 53); that the marketplace does not necessarily impose or foster caste discrimination (pp. 80-82) ; that minimum wage laws do not aid black teenagers (p. 87); and that licensing and governmental regulation may harm blacks as a group (pp. 87-89). Sowell's rhetoric, however, challenges the efficacy of any form of affirmative action and largely negates discrimination as a factor in the pervasive segregation and substantial inequality still experienced by blacks as a group in this country. In his quest to make a case for individual rights to equal opportunity and against group claims to equal results, Sowell has forEly, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 733 (1974) , See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170-72 (1980) . The anti-caste principle and Ely's "we-they" theory put a different twist on the issue of institutional competence raised in the text at note 57 supra: close scrutiny will be paid to any classification benefiting those who control the classification-making process. The anti-caste principle thus offers whites protection from being relegated to a second-class status within a system in which they (or any identifiable ethnic or religious minority) are in the minority, instead of protection from race-conscious attempts to elevate disadvantaged groups to full citizenship. Justice Brennan's opinion (joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) in Bakke showed a keen understanding of the proper purposes and potential dangers of racial classifications. Brennan directed the main focus of inquiry into whether the particular classification at issue stigmatized or singled out any politically powerless out-group. 438 U.S. at 355-62. Brennan also would apply "strict and searching" scrutiny, 438 U.S. at 361-62, to protect blacks (and identifiable white ethnic and religious minorities) against the dangers he articulated in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977) (Brennan, J,, concurring) , 60. The Court has played a similar role in interpreting congressional statutes. For example, the apparent conflict in Title VII between seniority and affirmative action drifted through the federal courts for several years. In Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984 , however, the Court held that Title VII barred federal courts from modifying a previously entered affirmative hiring and promotion consent plan in order to protect the newly employed minorities from lay-offs under a bona fide seniority system. The Court left open the issue of whether voluntary affirmative action programs and race-conscious decrees based on constitutional rather than statutory violations may modify bona fide seniority systems. Despite the far-reaching interpretation of the Stotts decision by William Bradford Reynolds, see Justice Dept. Declares Win Over Quotas, Washington Post, June 14, 1984, at Al, col . 1, at least two lower courts have already ruled that the decision has no application where a constitutional violation has been found. See NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers, 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984 ), and Arthur v. Buffalo Teachers Federation, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1982 ), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984 , where the Supreme Court refused to review a case similar to Stotts, except that findings of intentional discrimination had been made. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) ).
gotten that another critical individual right and a more complex reform vision may still be at issue: the individual right to be free from systemic injury and group wrong in a society where caste discrimination may still play some ugly part. 61
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
Because of his misreading of judicial decisions, Sowell fails to consider the appropriate role of an antimajoritarian court in reviewing legislative decisions designed to benefit identifiable groups who, Sowell concedes (pp. 13-14, 74, 109) , have been the subject of crippling official oppression in the past. Although Sowell may be more certain than others of the limited continuing impact of caste subjugation which was practiced decades ago, it is surprising that Sowell does not applaud the Court for giving elected legislatures as well as private employers, associations and even lower courts some leeway to grapple with this nettlesome issue. Contrary to Sowell's implication (p. 35), this process and the Court's warily deferential response to it are a far cry from the "politicization of race" that is said to have given rise to, among other tragedies, the Holocaust. For the Court to outlaw all legislative consideration of the systemic effects of discrimination and all attempts to formulate affirmative responses is to restrict legislative discretion and thus to promote judicial activism. 62 The modern Court, of course, has 61. Sowell's unwillingness to consider social context in analyzing individual freedom from discriminatory barriers is glaring in his chapter, "The Special Case of Women." Pp. 91-108. Sowell's major claim is that discrimination does not cause differences in pay between men and women; rather, "[m]ost of these differences relate to marriage and motherhood." P. 92. After all, "[m]arriage increases a man's rate of participation in the labor force compared to single men and reduces a woman's labor force participation rate compared to single women." P. 93 .
As with racial matters, Sowell's argument is largely irrelevant, because few women's rights advocates would deny that -viewed in a vacuum -marriage and pregnancy-related factors affect employment patterns. In matters of sex discrimination, however, Sowell refuses to consider what most of the women's rights legal scholars have claimed -that systematic patterns, resulting in part from discriminatory and stereotypical treatment of women, have created institutional biases under which equal opportunity is denied to women even where an individual trans- Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) .
While discussions of systematic sex discrimination can be complex, Sowell refuses even to question what forces and attitudes have created existing institutional arrangments. This blindness allows him to take surprisingly discriminatory positions. For example, Sowell claims that sex discrimination against women in the police and fire departments is defensible because, having established totally sex-segregated forces, "the introduction of women, as well as homosexuals" could compromise performance due to "powerful emotional attachments." P. 24.
62. In reviewing congressional measures to redress racial discrimination, the Court generally has rejected such an active role. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 [Vol. 83:106S more strictly reviewed even legislative actions by the majority in-group that exclude minority out-groups. 63 But that is consistent with at least one representation-reenforcing vision of the Court's proper role: protect the minority out-group from caste discrimination at the hands of the majority in-group. 64 Consistent with this anti-caste principle, whites are also offered judicial protection from any attempt to single any of them out for relegation to second-class status, but not judicial protection from race-conscious attempts by elected legislatures and executive officials to include minorities in the economic, educational, residential, and social mainstream. 65
The tougher question for judicial review is what role the Court should play in declaring rights and imposing remedies itself. The current debate on rights and remedies among the justices 66 and the commentators67 focuses primarily on the tension between the judicial desire to tailor remedies to do no more than overcome the direct effects of limited wrongs and the need to provide effective remedies for systemic wrongs. At times participants in this debate decry the claimed ineffectiveness of certain remedies 68 or contend that particular officials' actions, when viewed in isolation from one another and the underlying social context, have no continuing impacts requiring any remedy at all. 69 At other times, sweeping remedies are ordered based on findings that the intentionally discriminatory actions of particular officials contributed directly to all of the pervasive injury alleged, again without regard to the larger social context. 70
This debate seems trapped within an adjudicative framework that sees no role for the judiciary unless the individual wrongdoer can be haled into court to answer to specific victims' charges and, once such a personal wrong is found, binds the judiciary to provide full compensation. Given the causal complexities and the extent of the proof of historic caste discrimination that can be marshalled, this narrow understanding of public law adjudication and the need for courts to match rights and remedies serves to divide the justices into two camps: those who seek to limit remedies by minimizing wrongs and those who seek to maximize remedies by finding particular official wrongdoing as the direct cause of current disparities. 71 There is, however, another vision of judicial review that may be more sensitive both to the Court's proper role and to the complexity of the cases raising claims of systemic wrong and wide-ranging harm: declare the wrong, require the states to come forward with a commensurate remedy, encourage the Congress to confront the problem on a broader basis, and then independently review the responses of the responsible officials and legislatures. Rather than becoming obsessed with the costs or necessity of judicial imposition of particular remedies, even the Burger Court could then confront, for example, the evi- 71. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) , may represent the most patent example of this division. Chief Justice Burger, writing for four members of the Court, refused to review the evidence that an area-wide system of community discrimination in housing had combined with state-imposed segregation of blacks in one-race schools in the inner city to produce an expanding core of "blacks-only" schools within the City of Detroit, surrounded by a steadily receding "ring" of "whites-only" schools and communities. 418 U.S. at 728 n.7. Even a scholar sympathetic to restricting busing remedies found this refusal to face the principal issue in the case unwarranted. See J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 223-29 (1979 340, 348-53 (1983) (discussing cases in which the Court refused to see a causal relationship between housing discrimination and school segregation).
The apparent concern over massive interdistrict busing throughout a major metropolis, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 741-45, blinded these justices to the key issue: whether the proof and findings of a comprehensive system of containment of black families within a state-imposed core in the inner city warranted a holding of unconstitutional segregation. Given the fact that the court of appeals had already vacated the district court's order outlining an area-wide remedy and remanded for reconsideration in the trial court, see Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 252 (6th Cir. 1973 S 284 (1976) , that the constitutional wrong committed by HUD in restricting the public housing choices of blacks to locations within center-city Chicago amounted to an area-wide violation authorizing area-wide remedies. In Gautreaux, unlike in Milliken, the Court perceived that the remedy could be limited to allowing black f~es the choice of moving, if they wished, to subsidized housing opportunities in the white suburbs. There was no fear of intrusive remedies, and there was unanimous appreciation of the area-wide nature of the wrong of confining black families within blacks-only ghettoes. See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299; see also Dimond, supra note 10, at 39-42. If the Court would concentrate on declaring violations in light of the evidence, findings, and constitutional principles rather than fearing the consequences of remedies which are better left for initial promulgation by others and ultimate review by the Court on another day, there might be both greater consistency and more honesty in the Burger Court's segregation rulings.
[Vol. 83:1065 dence that a caste system of racial ghettoization still divides much of the country and declare fully the extent of any continuing wrong. 72 Because of the progress already made during the second Reconstruction, the Court is in a better position to speak plainly with us about the extent of any continuing caste wrong and about the limits of the judicial process in providing specific remedies. Whether large gaps would thereby be created between declared rights and judicial remedies and whether such gaps would spur action or reaction should not obscure the reality of judicial review: it can serve to remind all of us that we have not eradicated discrimination against an out-group just because we take down the whites-only signs from neighborhoods, schools, and jobs, even if the Court itself cannot open every old door and build new ones so that we can all enter together. Where Sowell's rhetoric would lead the Court to cut off all discussion of race-conscious remedies by condemning affirmative action once and for all, this alternative understanding of judicial review would encourage the continuing dialogue over rights and wrongs and redress in contemporary America. 73
CONCLUSION
We hope that a majority of the people and of the Court are not so close-minded in their vision of cultural reality or in the rhetoric of equal opportunity to foreclose claims and evidence that a system of caste still must be confronted by all our public and private institutions before we claim victory in the long struggle to eradicate discrimination against blacks in this country. Given our sad experience with the termination of the first Reconstruction, surely we ought not end the sec-72. In Brown I and Brown Il of course, the Warren Court did bifurcate consideration of the issues of violation and remedy. This does not mean, however, that we approve of all aspects of the Brown approach. First, remanding admittedly difficult remedial problems to the legislative process or to executive officials does not have to mean accepting all deliberate delay. But see Brown Il 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) . Imposing deadlines for a timely response by the responsible party and judicial ordering of provisional remedies until a meaningful response is forthcoming are viable alternatives. Second, the Court can place the duty to come forward with a responsive remedy on the appropriate party. In Brown Il however, the Court failed to focus attention on the constitutionally responsible party, le., the states, rather than local school districts. Finally, Brown l being the powerful declaration that it was, should have been explained in its fullest and simplest terms in order to give the ruling its full force politically, legally and socially. ond Reconstruction prematurely, whatever our rationale. 74 Any costs of grappling with the evidence of discrimination and with our national conscience over the need for and forms of affirmative action pale before the risks of adopting any color-blind whitewash which stubbornly declares that the current conditions and future prospects of racial minorities and women are culturally determined and not a fit subject for any public intervention. The law may have its limits, but Thomas Sowell has failed to make his case that we have reached them, or that we should declare the second Reconstruction finished.
74. In the Civil Rights Cases, [109 U.S. at 25] the Court wrote that the Negro emerging from slavery must cease "to be the special favorite of the laws." .•• We cannot in light of the history of the last century yield to that view. Had the Court in that decision and others been willing to "do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it did • . . for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves," [id., at 53] (Harlan, J., dissenting), we would not need now to permit the recognition of any "special wards." Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,401 (1978) (Marshall, J., separate opinion).
